Buffalo Law Review
Volume 12
Number 3 Symposium: New York Family Court
Act

Article 17

6-1-1963

Law, Liberty, And Morality. By H. L. A. Hart.
Robert B. Fleming
University at Buffalo School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Law and Society Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert B. Fleming, Law, Liberty, And Morality. By H. L. A. Hart., 12 Buff. L. Rev. 640 (1963).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol12/iss3/17

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University
at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BOOK REVIEWS
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MoRAuixy. By H. L. A. Hart. Stanford, California: Stanford
University Press, 1963. Pp. 88. $3.00.
Professor Hart presents three lectures first delivered at Stanford University as one of the series of Harry Camp Lectures, established in 1959
to elicit discussion of "topics bearing on the dignity and worth of the human
individual." The quoted phrase, however awkward, should be mentioned here,
as well as the denotation of lectutes, because both will bear upon appraisal.
Such lectures not infrequently offer scholars an opportunity to stand aside
from their usual preoccupations and pursue a more reflective vein.
In fact, however, this particular offering is simply the most recent installment in the continuing controversy between Professor Hart and Lord Devlin over
the enforcement of morals by means of the criminal law.' Their disputation
has not remained a private one, nor is it confined to Englishmen. Dean Rostow
and Professor Henkin most recently have also entered the lists, 2 the first on
the side of Devlin, the latter favoring Hart, but there has been no real joinder
of issue on this side of the Atlantic, if indeed on the other. This means that
the anticipations one may have reasonably entertained in approaching Professor Hart's lectures are not in order.
Professor Hart's concern here is to question society's justification for the
enforcement of private morality as such. The question itself is a moral one,
in his terms to be considered according to principles of "critical morality,"
i.e., the mere fact that a morality is being enforced does not provide the
necessary justification; witness such moralities as South Africa is struggling
to enforce. And justification there must be if we are to sacrifice the liberty of
those who are the subject of the enforcement. We should be quite sure what
such a price will purchase for society. The price is a very real one to Hart,
because of the many statutes in America, and England to a lesser degree,
which prohibit private sexual immorality on pain of criminal sanction. He
also is much disturbed by a recent, much mooted decision of the House of
Lords which broadly reasserts the existence of a common law offence of "conspiring to corrupt public morals." 3
The author's position is clear and straightforward. He believes that no
adequate justification can presently be shown for legally enforcing morality
for its own sake. He generally follows the view of John Stuart Mill, whose
essay, On Liberty, is cited frequently. Mill would require a showing of harm
1. See Lord Devlin, "The Enforcement of Morals," the Maccabaean lecture in Jurisprudence of the British Academy, 1959 (Oxford University Press, 1959); Prof. HLA.
Hart, Immorality -and Treason, The Listener, July 30, 1959, pp. 162-63; Lord Devlin,
Law, Democracy, and Morality, 110 U. Pa. L. Rev. 635 (1962).
2. Rostow, The Enforcement of Morals, 174 Cambridge L.J. (1960) at p. 190; Henkin, Morals and the Constitution: The Sin of Obscenity, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 391 (1963).
"3. Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions 2 A.E.R. 446 (1961).
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to others before society could apply sanctions. Professor Hart also takes
sustenance from the report of the Wolfenden Committee. This eminent group,
in recommending that the law against private homosexual practices between
consenting adults be relaxed, stated: "There must remain a realm of private
morality and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's
business." Lord Devlin's position is of course to the contrary, as was that
of the 18th Century judge and writer, James Fitzjames Stephen, whom Hart
summons to join the fray.4
The second lecture deals for the most part with examples from AngloAmerican law that are said to represent enforcement of morality as such.
Although Harts concern is with sexual problems, the examples taken from
Devlin and others unfortunately are not. The author shows that many of the
rules in question (e.g., the victim's consent is no defense to a charge of
murder.) do not exist solely to enforce morality; rather they are examples
of paternalism. Hart agrees that in punishing criminals judges do weigh the
relative wickedness of persons being sentenced, applying morality directly so
to speak, but he correctly shows that this fact has no logical relevance to the
issue of what acts may be punished. In discussing the crime of bigamy, the
author stresses the peculiar fact that in most common law jurisdictions only
the second marriage ceremony, the public act, is proscribed, not the private
immorality of the resulting cohabitation. The crime is in the nature of a
nuisance, to be condemned by reason of its affront to others, and not by reason
alone of the moral problem involved. Turning from examples, the author
concludes this lecture with a consideration of the more positive grounds offered
by Lord Devlin for his conclusion that "the suppression of vice is as much
the law's business as the suppression of subversive activities." Devlin's position
in substance is that a shared morality is essential to society's existence and
that immorality jeopardizes or weakens society. Professor Hart, while agreeing
with the first assertion, shows that there is no evidence on which to base the
latter, certainly at least with respect to private deviations from accepted sexual
morality.
In his final lecture, the best of the three, the author deals with clarity
and insight with a variety of topics. He is essentially concerned with identifying
what he terms an extreme thesis for enforcing morality, attributed to Stephen,
the view that such enforcement "is justified not by its consequences but as
a value in itself." Considering enforcement in the form of coercion, Hart
concludes that coerced conformity with a moral code, as distinguished from
voluntary compliance, can have no moral value. Considering the punitive aspect
of enforcement, especially in the case of sexual violations where there is no
victim, Hart finds such retributive sanctions wholly- without justification.
Adding the evil of suffering "to the evil of immorality as its punishment" can
4. Stephen's book, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity, was written in the last century, so
Hart states, as a direct reply to Mill's essay, Onl'iberty.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
serve no moral end. Stephen's strong theme of retribution is identified by
Hart with a supposed need for denunciation: moral condemnation of the
offender and ratification of the violated morality. Hart would employ words,
rather than punishment, for any necessary denunciation, the latter being ineffective in his view to preserve morality. Professor Hart next distinguishes
between the need to preserve morality and moral conservatism, there being
no justification for the latter, while the former can as well be achieved by
means other than legal sanctions. The lecture concludes with a reminder that
commitment to democratic principles does not entail what Professor Hart
terms "moral populism: the view that the majority have a moral right to dictate
how all shall live."
The lectures certainly show Professor Hart scoring a fair share of points
in the controversy with Lord Devlin. But somehow his work strikes one as
being old-fashioned and missing the point; not the point presented by his
opponent, but the general problem of the relation of private morality as such
to the law. This despite the author's evident dedication to liberty and the
many insights he affords us. His logic is exemplary, but we seem to end up
with most of the juice squeezed out, with the life of the problem missing. To
point out the non sequitur in the example of the judges' gradation of sentences
may be a service and add a score against Devlin; however, it does not meet
the problems, and opportunities perhaps, for law and morality which inhere
in the judges' practice.
Our author is not the only contestant who leaves us unsatisfied. Louis
Henkin's discussion of the "sin of obscenity," noted earlier, presents the most
recent case. His fine essay explores the origins of morals legislation, and I
believe, establishes the fact that the lawmaker's impulse is directed against
immorality as such. His treatment is in terms of our Constitution, and by
that approach the rather frightening conclusion is reached that there is no
basis for morals legislation: legislators can constitutionally deal only with the
reasonable, the rational, and in a reasonable way; private morality is not
in the rational order; therefore, etc. Accordingly, Henkin would place America
in the Hart camp, if only because of our special constitutional situation.
If our existing morals legislation is largely based upon the irrational, we
are not forced thereby to discard it out of hand with Professor Henkin,6 or
fail to see its implications with Professor Hart, resolving to do better in the
future. Nor can we expect much help from Lord Devlin in light of Hart's
analysis of Devlin's arguments. Rather it would seem in order to examine
anew what we now take to be irrational, to explore the possibilities of rationalizing morals, particularly in relation to law. 6 'Their' claim to the effort would
5. It should be noted that Professor Henkin neither advocates nor predicts revolutionary progress in this direction.
6. This task of the centuries is perhaps the most formidable that can be imagined, but
we cannot fairly be said to be without hope of finding some hint of order or rhyme or
reason in "the common condition of mankind." In fact our law contemplates such, and
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seem to be a weighty one, if only because of their embodiment in so much
of our law. Of course morality can make no claims; persons, human beings
have claims and wants and needs. And in society they should be able to ask
of the law a commitment to meet many of them. As we come to know more
of the irrational, we may hardly decide that much of our morals legislation
can be securely justified. But we may well find that such laws are much more
than religious relics and may in fact be expressive of proper needs of our
7
citizens.
The basic problem of having the law enforce private morality as such, as
we are confronted with it, arose as Lord Devlin stated when the state recognized
freedom of worship and conscience. Professor Hart in these lectures does
not seek a means of evaluating the claims of morality as such on the law;
rather, he successfully disposes of some of the justifications offered by others
for the enforcement of morals. If these grounds are admittedly unsatisfactory,
it remains true that Professor Hart has broken no new ground in dealing with
the larger problem. His impressive contribution is to clarify the situation, to
enable us to get on thus with the main task ever present: to maximize the
good our best moral perceptions and thought can add to the law.
ROBERT B. FLEmIG
Professor of Law
State University of
New York at Buffalo

CiVI. JusT cE AND TE JuRy. By Charles W. Joiner. Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1962. Pp. 238. $6.95 (Under the Auspices
of and in Collaboration with the International Academy of Trial Lawyers).
Delay in the courts, mounting jury verdicts and the increased cost of
administering civil justice have converged in the last decade to question anew
the value of the jury in civil cases. Although our Federal Constitution requires
a jury trial in the Federal Courts incertain "suits at common law," it does
not require a trial by jury in civil cases in state courts. Most state constitutions
and statutes require it, but these provisions are subject to change. Hence, the
question arises whether the several states should follow the lead of Great Britain,
some European and most South American countries in limiting jury trials to
we all generally do the same in facing our lives; the newer sciences, particularly psychiatry,
daily yield more insights to help us.
7. Consider, e.g., the work of Robert Rodes, A Prospectus for a SymbolisUt Jursprudence, 2 Natural L. Forum 88 (1957). In this original and provocative essay Professor
Rodes effectively argues for a symbolic role of the law as fulfilling vital human needs.
In doing so, he (rationally) makes deep inroads.upon what Professor Henkin and others
would seem to consider irrational beyond hope. Of the participants in the controversy
discussed herein, Stephen, if he can be considered such, is the only one who shows much
appreciation for the role of symbolism in the law. This should not be overlooked, however much his harshness repels us.

